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Abstract
This paper presents an annotation scheme for English modal verbs together with sense-annotated data from the news domain. We
describe our annotation scheme and discuss problematic cases for modality annotation based on the inter-annotator agreement during
the annotation. Furthermore, we present experiments on automatic sense tagging, showing that our annotations do provide a valuable
training resource for NLP systems.
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1. Introduction
Much recent work in NLP has been centrally concerned
with modality and modal verbs. Most prominent is the
area of sentiment analysis (Wiebe et al., 2005) and allied
areas such as hedge detection (Medlock and Briscoe, 2007;
Morante and Daelemans, 2009), committed belief tagging
(Diab et al., 2009), factuality profiling (Saurı´ and Puste-
jovsky, 2009), and further areas such as information extrac-
tion, where the ability to distinguish between events por-
trayed as certain or real and others portrayed as uncertain
or non-factual is important.
Merely detecting the presence of a modal expression is not
always sufficient. For instance, if we want to mark specula-
tive sentences, we might be interested only in the epistemic
reading(1b) of sentence (1).
(1) My dad COULD have done it.
a. My dad had the ability/capacity to do it.
b. It’s possible that my dad did it.
Polysemy is common among modals and many, if not all
of them can express several major kinds of modal mean-
ing. Can, for instance, seems to have at least 3 meanings.
In its dynamic use, as seen in (1a), it refers to the ability
of a person or animal to perform some action, or to the ca-
pacity of an instrument or similar. In its epistemic sense,
shown in (1b), can says that the speaker considers some
state of affairs (im)possible given the evidence they have.
In its deontic use, shown in (2), can is used to talk about
permission.1
(2) Deontic: You CAN come in now!
By contrast, the form might is very specialized: this auxil-
iary only seems to express epistemic modality.
(3) The director of the provincial Aids Action Unit
... suggested this week the figures MIGHT even be
higher than McKerrow’s.
1In our terminology, we follow (Palmer, 1986) for the most
part.
In this work, we present sense-annotations by two anno-
tators of English modal verbs on the 535 documents of the
first MPQA corpus release (Wiebe et al., 2005). This choice
is motivated by an interest in subjectivity analysis. The an-
notations in the MPQA corpus reflect the total contextual-
ized understandings of larger spans–e.g. in example (3),
the MPQA has not annotated might individually but only
as part of the span might even be higher than. We want to
complement the MPQA annotations with sense-annotations
of individual modal instances, as part of a larger project
of studying the extent to which the interpretation of larger
spans can be derived from their parts. Exploring the extent
to which subjective meanings are compositional also makes
sense from a resource point of view given that the annota-
tion of larger spans results in greater data sparsity. A side
benefit of our work is that we provide a partial replication of
the MPQA annotations, which mostly reflect the judgment
of one annotator rather than an adjudicated gold standard.
Finally, our annotations provide training data on modal
senses for the news domain and will also be useful to cor-
pus linguists. Our annotations are available for download at
www.uni-hildesheim.de/ruppenhofer/data.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In
section 2., we situate our work in the research context.
We go on to describe our annotation scheme and resulting
corpus in section 3. and give numbers for inter-annotator
agreement as well as a discussion of problematic cases for
the annotation of English modal verbs. In section 4., we
present experiments on automatic sense tagging, providing
evidence that our annotations can be used as training data
for NLP systems. In section 5., we compare our annotations
to the original ones in the MPQA corpus and in section 6.
we conclude.
2. Related work
Baker et al. (2010) developed a modality annotation
scheme, a modality lexicon, and built two automatic tag-
gers on the basis of the lexicon and the annotation scheme.
Like our annotation scheme, Baker et al. (2010)’s scheme
identifies three components of modal meaning: a modal ex-
pression, a source and a target. The modality lexicon was
produced semi-automatically, starting from a hand-selected
seed list of modal words and phrases. The lexicon contains
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not only modal verbs but also predicates that exhibit what
is called sub-lexical modality, namely, predicates such as
try and want. The inventory of modal categories given to
annotators was also somewhat different from ours. The au-
thors basically work with eight types of factivitiy-related
modality but split some of them into two categories for the
purposes of annotation. For instance, the category Inten-
tion is referenced by the two annotation choices “H intends
[to make P true/false]” and “H does not intend [to make P
true/false]”, where H stands for holder and P for the propo-
sition at issue. The resulting 13 categories were presented
to the annotators ordered by specificity and annotators were
instructed to choose the first applicable one. For instance,
one so-called “entailment grouping” that the ordering of
categories reflects is {succeeds → tries → intends → is
able → wants}. We compare our inventory to Baker et
al. (2010)’s below in Section 3.2. Some key practical differ-
ences are that in our annotation we allow multiple labeling
of a token, that is, explicit underspecification. While we
did not introduce any dummy marking for cases where the
implicit text producer is the source (or holder, in Baker et
al. (2010)’s way of talking), we did label overt occurrences
of sources. In the work of Baker et al. (2010), no holders
were marked at all for lack of time, though the notion it-
self was acknowledged to be a key part of modality. Two
final differences to note are that Baker et al. (2010)’s anno-
tations are not hand-validated and, unlike the lexicon, they
were not made publicly available.
Saurı´ (2008)’s work on automatically building factuality
profiles also involves analyzing modal verbs (which are
grouped with modal particles, along with adjectives and ad-
verbs such as certain and certainly.) In FactBank, the as-
sociated lexical resource by Saurı´ and Pustejovsky (2009),
208 documents are manually annotated according to the
notion of event as defined in TimeML (Pustejovsky et al.,
2005). Within the FactBank annotations, different uses of
modals are distinguishable only if they exhibit different fac-
tuality values.
Matsuyoshi et al. (2010) perform, among other things, an-
notation of modals on Japanese data as part of what they
call an extended modality scheme with seven components
of annotation: Source, Time, Conditional, Primary modal-
ity type, Actuality, Evaluation and Focus.
In corpus linguistic work, quantitative research on modals
typically has not relied on sense-annotated instances. For
instance, in a study of modals in the British National Cor-
pus, Kennedy (2002) looks at the relative frequencies of
modals and the differences in their frequencies across gen-
res. Questions of semantics are investigated only indirectly,
by making inferences about the kind of semantics that is as-
sociated with the different phrasal patterns in which modals
participate. Annotated data of the kind we present will al-
low research to directly take different senses of modals into
account.
3. Annotations
3.1. Format and Tool
All annotations were carried out using the Salto annotation
tool on TigerXML-format data (Erk and Pado, 2004). The
annotation consisted of labeling terminal and non-terminal
nodes of an automatically predicted constituency parse2
with annotation frames and roles. The interface is shown
in Figure 1.
3.2. General Considerations
The linguistic analysis of modality is by no means settled.
Von Fintel (2006) notes that “[i]n the descriptive literature
on modality, there is taxonomic exuberance”. In our anno-
tations, we have so far targeted five different modal lem-
mas, can/could, may/might, must, ought, and shall/should.
For these modals we assume the sense inventory specified
in Table 1. 3
can may must ought shall
epistemic + + + + +
deontic + + + + +
dynamic + - - - -
optative - + - - -
concessive - + - - -
conditional - - - - +
Table 1: Senses of the modals
Compared to Baker et al. (2010)’s scheme, we have fewer
categories. However, to a large degree this difference re-
sults from the fact that we work with modal verbs only.
The English modal verbs do not cover all of the categories
in Baker et al. (2010)’s scheme. There are, for instance, no
modal verbs expressing Effort or Success in English. We
also have not used a category similar to Baker et al. (2010)’s
Intention because we have not tackled will in our work yet
and because the few instances of shall in our data did not
exemplify a volitional/intentional reading. Our epistemic
uses of modals are covered by their Belief category. Unlike
them, we have no annotations of (Firm)Belief for unmodal-
ized sentences since we explicitly target modal verbs.
As shown by Table 1, there is overlap/similarity between
modal meanings across items. May and can both express
permission, i.e. they have a deontic use. Not too surpris-
ingly, there is no complete interchangeability. For instance,
as pointed out by Huddleston (2002, 175), while negation
scopes over the possibility meaning of can, it is the reverse
with may, as shown by (4–5).
(4) He CANnot have done it.
‘It is not possible that he did it.’
(5) He MAY not have done it.
‘It is possible that he didn’t do it.’
Differences also exist in certain formulaic uses where the
expression of permission by may is acceptable but the use
of can is not or much less so.
(6) I would like, if I may/*?can, to take you on a
strange journey.
2The data was parsed using the Berkeley parser (Petrov and
Klein, 2007)
3When distributing the corpus, we will split up shall and
should as they are not fully parallel. Shall does not occur in con-
ditionals with auxiliary inversion, for instance.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Salto annotation tool
Further, as already suggested by the previous example,
some of the modals have special uses. For instance, the
optative and concessive categories are used to account for
special uses of the modal may:
(7) Optative: Long MAY she live!
(8) Concessive: But, fool though he MAY be, he is
powerful.
In the optative use, may expresses a wish rather than spec-
ulating about a state of affairs or giving permission. The
concessive use is a bit like the epistemic use, except that
it is clear from the context that the speaker takes the rel-
evant state of affairs as a given rather than considering it
a possibility. The conditional use of should occurs in if -
clauses and inversion constructions such as Should anyone
call, please take a message. Of course, many modals are
part of idioms. For instance, can’t is part of the negative
polarity item can’t stand.
In addition to distinguishing the senses of modals, we an-
notate further aspects of modality. PROPOSITION is the
content that the modal verb modalizes. Typically, it cor-
responds to a sentence or clause. If the sentence node in-
cludes discourse connectives (e.g. however) or adverbials
that scope higher than the modal, such as quite frankly in
(9), then we leave these out of the PROPOSITION.
(9) Quite frankly, [he MAY be the better player
PROPOSITION].
Although the modal expressions that we annotated do occur
nested with each other e.g. in Southern dialects of Amer-
ican English, no embeddings such as might could were
found in our data. Since we also did not cover modal ex-
pressions such as able for this work, we have no embed-
dings in our data at all. Nevertheless, the scheme already
covers how such cases would be treated: they would be han-
dled by simply embedding one modal in the other’s Propo-
sition. For instance, in He might be able to help you, the
dynamic (ability) meaning of able would occur inside the
proposition modalized by might.
In our annotation, we omit complementizers from PROPO-
SITIONs, as shown by (10) but we do include relative pro-
nouns, as shown by (11). SOURCE marks the referents
whose point of view on the PROPOSITION is presented.
LINKs are predicates of communication or cognition that
present the SOURCE of a PROPOSITION. We do not con-
strain the syntactic relations between LINK and SOURCE,
as shown in (12). E.g. if SOURCE is expressed by an NP
that depends on a prepositional LINK, we still only anno-
tate the NP inside the PP that refers to the LINK referent.
Similarly, in (13), the LINK predicate serves as a depicitve
modifier of the SOURCE rather than as a finite clausal pred-
icate taking the SOURCE as a dependent.
(10) [Europe’s environment ministers SOURCE] have
[agreed LINK] that [all 15 EU nations SHOULD ad-
here to the Kyoto Protocol PROPOSITION].
(11) But how could Blair have ” a Commonwealth re-
port ” when no one else had received such a report
[that SHOULD be channeled through the Secretariat
to all members PROPOSITION] , [asked LINK] [one
of the other 53 Commonwealth leaders at the re-
treat SOURCE] ?
(12) [Under LINK] [the law SOURCE], [a new president
SHOULD be installed within three months PROPO-
SITION].
(13) [Several governments SOURCE] joined the chorus
, [saying LINK] [the prisoners SHOULD be granted




As with ought to, we distinguish two senses for must.
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• The epistemic use is concerned with the speaker being
compelled to come to a particular conclusion given her
state of knowledge.
(14) He MUST be home now. It’s past 7 o’clock.
• The deontic use is about obligations that are imposed
by some source on an agent, who may (15) or may not
(16) be expressed as part of the modalized proposition.
(15) You MUST go home now.
(16) The door MUST remain closed at all times.
Among cases of epistemic modality, we do not distinguish
between cases of what Huddleston et al. (2002) call subjec-
tive as opposed to objective inferences. While (17) is not
a logically compelling inference, (18) follows from mathe-
matical laws.
(17) The light is on. He MUST be home.
(18) John is 35 and Peter is only a year or two older than
John so he MUST be under 40 still.
Within the category of deontic modality, which is con-
cerned with what the world should be like according to
some source, we do not make any sub-distinctions based
on the nature of the force that impinges on the actor. Thus,
example (19) in which an external, relatively impersonal
force is the source of the compulsion, is treated no different
than example (20), where the pull on the actor comes from
within his own psyche.
(19) Dogs MUST be leashed here. A city ordinance re-
quires it.
(20) I really MUST call him. He will be worried.
Further, we do not make any distinction between reports
of obligations (21) and occasions where the obligation is
being imposed by the speech act (22). Example (15) above
is actually ambiguous between those two cases, unlike the
contextualized uses in (21) and (22).
(21) Mom says you MUST go home now. It’s past 10
pm.
(22) You MUST go home now. I want you gone.
3.3.2. Should
As with ought to we distinguish among two main senses.
• The epistemic use is concerned with the speaker being
compelled to come to a particular conclusion given her
state of knowledge.
(23) He SHOULD be home now. It’s past 7 o’clock.
• The deontic use is about imposing an obligation or re-
porting the existence of an obligation.
(24) You SHOULD go home now.
Both in its epistemic and its deontic uses, should is typi-
cally weaker than must.
In addition to the above two uses, we recognize a special
use in conditional constructions, one type of which also in-
volves subject-auxiliary inversion:
(25) SHOULD you see him, please tell him to call me.
(26) If you SHOULD see him, please tell him to call me.
Apart from the above uses, there exist additional minor id-
iomatic uses. These are exemplified below in (27)-(30) with
the labels that Huddleston et al. (2002) use. We have not
encountered these in our data. Note that we would simply
treat (28)-(30) as deontic cases.
(27) It was odd that she should be so rigid. (emotive)
(28) It is essential that he should be apprehended.
(mandative)
(29) Her mother worked for Mr. Morse and so she
could never bring her friends to their rooms lest
she should annoy the Morses. (adversative)
(30) Her mother worked for Mr. Morse and so she could
never bring her friends to their rooms in order that
she should not annoy the Morses. (purposive)
3.3.3. Ought to
We distinguish among two senses.
• The epistemic use is concerned with the speaker being
compelled to come to a particular conclusion given her
state of knowledge.
(31) He OUGHT TO be home now. It’s past 7
o’clock.
• The deontic use is about imposing an obligation or re-
porting the existence of an obligation.
(32) You OUGHT TO go home now.
3.3.4. May/might
We distinguish among the following senses:
• The epistemic use is concerned with the speaker’s pos-
sible conclusions given her state of knowledge. Unlike
must which is used to express deontic and epistemic
necessity, may and might concern deontic and epis-
temic possibility.
(33) He MAY be home now. It’s past 7 o’clock.
(34) These animals MAY be dangerous.
• The deontic use is about giving permission.
(35) Yes, you MAY come in now.
• The concessive use is in principle also compatible with
the epistemic one. We use it in those cases where it’s
clear from the context that the speaker actually thinks
the proposition holds rather than it merely possibly
holding.
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(36) He MAY be a professor, but he is still a fool.
• The optative is used to express a wish.
(37) MAY you live a 100 years!
3.3.5. Can
We distinguish three senses of can, as exemplified in (38–
45).
• The dynamic use concerns ability or potential for in-
volvement in events or behavior.
(38) My father can RUN real fast.
(39) The wind CAN still get in.
(40) These animals CAN be aggressive
(41) Garlic blossoms CAN be white or pink.
• The deontic use is about giving permission.
(42) You CAN come in now!
(43) We CAN borrow up to six books at a time.
• The epistemic use concerns the possibility for the
speaker to come to certain conclusions.
(44) He says it was Jill but it CAN’T have been.
(45) That CAN’T be her - she’s twenty five, that
woman is at least 45.
The divisions we make follow those of Huddleston et
al. (2002).
The uses of can are often divided up differently. For in-
stance, in the grammar of Quirk et al. (1985), the sense
division for can recognizes the following categories:
• Ability (able to, capable of , know how to)
• Possibility (it is possible for x to)
• Permission (may, be allowed to)
Ability would apply only to (38) and Possibility would
cover (39–41). (Quirk et al., 1985)’s Permission category
corresponds to our deontic category. Our epistemic cases
would be collapsed into their Possibility sense.
The main reason for the non-epistemic analysis by Quirk
et al. (1985) is the following. For instance, in a sentence
such as (40) there is no speculation about whether or not
the animals in question are or are not dangerous, as in (34)
above. Instead there is a simple assertion that they have the
disposition or propensity to be dangerous on occasion, or
that some of them are dangerous. In line with that, (Quirk
et al., 1985) use a paraphrase test of possible-to to assess
the Possibility uses of can, rather than a paraphrase test of
the form possible-that.
(46) It is possible for these animals to be dangerous. (cf.
40)
(47) He says it was Jill but it is not possible for her to
have done it. (cf. 44)
Overall, can is not as widely usable in the clear epistemic
cases where may can occur. Example (48) is very odd com-
pared to (44–45).
(48) ??She CAN be home now. It’s past 7 o’clock.
It is only in negated uses such as (44) and (45) that can
looks plausibly like an epistemic modal that assesses the
factuality of past or present states of affairs.
At an earlier stage of this research we tried to make a four-
way distinction between Ability, Possibility, Epistemic and
Deontic uses, which would have constituted a combination
of Huddleston et al. (2002) and Quirk et al. (1985). How-
ever, we but found that agreement was very poor and so
we decided to stick with Huddleston et al. (2002)’s distinc-
tions for the purposes of the present work. Nonetheless, as
will be shown and discussed more below, can was the most
difficult modal to get agreement on.
Finally, we note that could can have all the meanings of
can, although in some cases they are only possible in con-
texts of shifted tense (49-54). A notable difference between
can and could is that could seems to readily allow for an
epistemic reading in assertive contexts such as (54).
(49) My father COULD run really fast when he was
younger.
(50) Water COULD still get in.
(51) I knocked and she said I COULD come in.
(52) Back then, Poinsettias COULD only be red or yel-
low but now they have created blue ones, too.
(53) I said that COULDN’T be her - she was twenty five,
while that woman was at least 45.
(54) The NHL star hinted he COULD be in the lineup.
3.4. Agreement
We measured inter-annotator agreement between the two
annotors, determining average percentage agreement and
Cohen’s kappa. As suggested by Table 2, for most modals
the distribution of senses was highly skewed, resulting in
high percentage agreement on the many clear cases but
making it difficult to achieve a high kappa value. We omit
ought to from the table because there are only 4 instances,
on all of which the annotators agreed. Recall that we can-
not compare our results to Baker et al. (2010)’s work since
the annotation there was done by a single annotator.
items kappa %-agreement
may/might 195 0.621 0.89
must 183 0.848 0.98
shall/should 182 0.602 0.96
can 598 0.614 0.77
Table 2: Kappa and average percentage agreement per
modal
In what follows we show confusion matrices for two of the
individual predicates. Table 3 shows that for can, there was
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very little confusion between deontic and epistemic read-
ings. The majority of cases involved uncertainty about the
boundaries between the dynamic and the deontic senses and
between the dynamic and the epistemic senses.
Cond. Deont. Dynam. Epist.
Conditional 0 0 1 0
Deontic 0 78 32 4
Dynamic 0 46 271 15
Epistemic 0 5 33 113
Table 3: Confusion matrix for can
Example (55) shows an example where one annotator chose
the dynamic category and the other the deontic one. On the
deontic reading, there is a sort of prohibition against con-
sidering Al Qaeda a state party based on the consideration
that they are a terrorist group. On the dynamic reading, the
speaker reports on the failure of efforts to think of Al Qaeda
in a way that makes them appear as a state party.
(55) ’ It will not change their material life on a day-to-
day basis : they will continue to be treated well
because that ’s what the United States does , ”
said Fleischer , who noted neither group would be
granted prisoner of war status . And , ” Al Qaeda
is an international terrorist group and CANNOT be
considered a state party to the Geneva Convention
. Its members therefore are not covered , ” by the
accord , said the spokesman .
Example (56) exemplifies a case of disagreement between
an epistemic and a dynamic reading. In that example, there
is a sort of scope-ambiguity between the epistemic marker
and the existential reading of coups. On the first reading,
with the epistemic operator outscoping the existential quan-
tification, it is possible that any coups that occur will desta-
bilize the region. On the second reading, with the exis-
tential quantification outsocping the epistemic operator, we
say about any coups that might occur that they would have
the power to destabilize the region. Similarly, a sentence
such as ”The article claims that a sun storm could cause
20 x more economic damage than Katrina” would be said
not to present a speculation on what might be an ongoing
event but to report on the generic power of a sun storm to
do damage.
(56) Venezuela is this hemisphere ’s second-oldest
democracy . At a time when democracy is losing
currency in many countries , particularly Argentina
, coups COULD be potentially destabilizing to the
region . ” We are happy to collectively have over-
come the era of coup d’etats in the region , and
when events in Venezuela took on the appearance
of a military coup there was a reaction by every-
one , ” said Brazil ’s President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso .
In the case of may, too, there was no difficulty in distin-
guishing epistemic and deontic uses (Table 4). The main
problem was the distinction between the epistemic category
and the special concessive sense. An example of a disagree-
ment is given in (57), where there was uncertainty whether
the text author conceded what was presented in the previ-
ous sentence: that some irregular forces captured in battle
need not be considered POWs.
Concess. Deont. Optat. Epist.
Concessive 10 1 0 10
Deontic 0 6 0 0
Optative 0 0 1 0
Dynamic 0 0 0 1
Epistemic 4 2 0 160
Table 4: Confusion matrix for may
(57) The Geneva Convention does contemplate that
some irregular forces captured in battle need not be
considered POWs. That MAY well apply to mem-
bers of al-Qaeda , a free-floating band of terrorists.
But not all of those at Gitmo are al-Qaeda men.
One of the annotators used about one and half as many con-
cessive labels as the other, indicating a possible personal
bias and/or a lack of clarity in the guidelines. The epis-
temic and concessive categories are, however, closely re-
lated and indeed candidates for merging, as pointed out in
section 3.2.
About shall not much of interest can be said since there
was such a strong majority sense in the form of the deontic
uses, which accounted for 169 of the 182 instances. We
therefore dispense with displaying a confusion matrix. The
same goes for must, which had 171 agreed-upon deontic
uses among the 183 instances.
4. Automatic Sense Tagging
To provide proof of concept and show that our sense cat-
egories are meaningful and can be learned by an auto-
matic system, we implemented a simple modality tagger
and trained it on the annotated data.
4.1. Experimental setup
In our experiments we used a 10-fold cross-validation setup
where, for each fold, we split the annotated data for each of
the modal verbs in a training set (90%) and a test set (10%).
Then we trained a maximum entropy classifier4 on features
extracted from the training set and predicted the senses for
each modal verb in the test set. We extracted three different
feature types: target-specific features, context features and
syntactic path features. Table 5 gives a short description of
each feature type.
4.2. Results
Table 6 presents results for the automatic annotation of
modal verb senses. To facilitate comparability, the first
two rows show the interannotator agreement (IAA) for the
human annotators (κ and % agreement). Row 3 displays




i word form, lemma and POS of the target modal
ii syntactic category of parent/grandparent/
grandgrandparent node
iii word, lemma and POS of the leftmost child node
of parent/grandparent/grandgrandparent
Context features:
i bag of words/lemmas/POS context to the left
and to the right of the target
ii word/lemma/POS of token in sentence-initial
position
Path features:
i syntactic categories along the path from target
to root node in the syntax tree
ii combinations (bigrams/trigrams) of the root path
features (above)
iii syntactic categories along the path to the leftmost
child node for all non-terminal nodes to the right
of the modal (siblings right)
iv word form/lemma/POS for the leftmost child node
v path to the leftmost child node for all non-terminal
nodes to the left of the modal (siblings left)
vi word form/lemma/POS for the leftmost child
Table 5: Feature types used for automatic sense tagging
when always predicting the most frequent sense for a partic-
ular modal verb). The baseline is already quite high for the
modals must and shall/should, which both have the deontic
reading as their dominant sense in our data. Such a skewed
distribution makes it hard for machine learning methods to
beat the baseline as there is only little training data for the
less frequent senses.
Rows 4-6 show the impact of each of the individual feature
types on classification accuracy. Rows 7-10 present results
for using all three, target-specific features, context and path
features, for varying context sizes. Here we see that a small
context window is sufficient while larger context sizes seem
to hurt performance.
Rows 11-13 show results for combinations of only two
feature types. For can we obtain best results (68.70%)
when using target-specific features and context features
only, while including path features leads to a decrease in
performance of around 2%. For may/might we see a dif-
ferent picture. Here the path features seem to encode more
important information. Using only target-specific features
and path features yields an improvement of around 2% over
using a combination of all three feature types. This clearly
shows the importance of tuning the features to the specific
target word. For shall/should we managed to achieve a
small improvement when using only a subset of the path
features (row 14). For must, however, we were not able to
improve on the baseline.
These results are quite promising, considering that we put
only little effort in developing the system. The main goal of
our experiments was to show that our sense inventory repre-
sent a meaningful categorisation and that the annotated data
can be used as a resource for the development of a modality
tagger. There is room for improvement with regard to the
feature set as well as to the algorithmic side of the system,
but both is beyond the scope of this paper. Future work
might explore the use of external knowledge sources like
WordNet or FrameNet for incorporating semantic informa-
tion in the feature set. To beat the strong baseline for must,
it is necessary to address the class imbalance problem.
5. Comparison to the original MPQA
annotations
Comparing our annotations to that in the MPQA, we find
that the two are very close in coverage: about 80% of
the modal instances that we labeled are also covered by a
span in MPQA.5 One significant exception is can, a third
of whose instances are not part of a subjective span in the
MPQA. Table 7 illustrates the point mentioned above that
many instances of modals are only annotated as part of a
larger span. As shown by the total, only about 30.8% of all
modal instances are in a span by themselves. The remaining
cases are the ones where it will be interesting to see how the
word sense of the modal contributes to the interpretation of
the span.
Total occurrences only modal in span
ESE DSE OSE ESE DSE OSE
can 125 26 6 7 0 0
cannot 69 9 2 12 0 0
could 153 23 2 36 0 0
couldn’t 0 0 0 0 0 0
may 104 5 1 40 0 0
might 53 2 1 28 0 0
must 163 10 1 58 0 0
shall 11 0 0 1 0 0
should 241 14 0 99 1 0
ought to 4 0 0 3 0 0
Total 923 89 13 284 1 0
Table 7: Modals and spans in the MPQA
6. Conclusions
We have presented sense annotations of English modal
verbs in the MPQA corpus. These annotations can be used
in multiple ways. They can serve as data for corpus linguis-
tic studies or as training data for word sense disambigua-
tion. Importantly, they can be a starting point for analyzing
whether the interpretation of the larger spans of text that are
marked in the MPQA corpus can be derived composition-
ally.
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can may/might must shall/should
1 IAA (κ) 61.40 62.10 84.80 60.20
2 IAA (% agreement) 77.00 89.00 98.00 96.00
3 baseline (most freq.) 52.17 82.86 93.50 90.32
4 target 66.23 83.81 91.00 90.97
5 context 58.70 80.95 93.50 90.97
6 path 57.25 85.24 93.50 90.97
7 context=3 66.52 83.81 93.50 90.65
8 context=5 66.67 83.81 93.50 90.65
9 context=7 66.38 82.38 93.50 90.65
10 context=10 65.80 83.33 93.50 90.32
11 context=3, target 68.70 81.43 93.50 91.29
12 context=3, path 59.42 83.33 93.50 90.65
13 context=0, target, path 66.09 85.71 93.00 91.29
14 context=0, siblings left/right 66.67 84.29 93.50 90.32
15 context=0, root/siblings left 64.78 85.24 91.00 91.61
16 context=0, root/siblings right 66.23 85.71 93.00 91.29
Table 6: Accuracies for automatic prediction of modal verb senses for different feature settings
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